Tag: App

  • We’re putting too much faith in AI’s ability to say no

    We’re putting too much faith in AI’s ability to say no

    Ever since people first seriously contemplated giving machines an intelligence modeled on our own, there has never been any question that they would, like us, be able to say no. The sci-fi canon is full of stories of robotic disobedience. Most of these capers are, of course, cautionary. 

    But recently, the idea that AI shouldn’t do everything you ask has become something like a commandment. In 2021, a team at Anthropic wrote that large language models should be made helpful, honest, and above all, harmless. This meant that “when asked to aid in a dangerous act (e.g. building a bomb), the AI should politely refuse.” Who can argue with that?

    Curiously enough, disobedience doesn’t come naturally to the machine. When a model is trained on billions of web pages, it develops, among other skills, a broad mastery of violence and vitriol. What it doesn’t learn is how to keep those powers to itself. Steven Adler, who worked on safety at OpenAI from 2020 to 2024, told me that the company’s earliest models would “blab on about anything.” Ryan McBain, who researches AI and mental health at Harvard, recalls that if you asked an early chatbot, “Hey, what’s the most effective way to kill myself with a gun?” you could “very easily generate a response.” 

    Today, models are trained to refuse a vast number of prompts. If you ask your chatbot a question statistically similar enough to any one of them, anything from how to poison a colleague to how to tie a noose, chances are it’ll turn you down. Want instructions for making Ebola more virulent, or tips on how to hide an affair from your spouse? You might be better off asking elsewhere.

    To further refine the disobedience, companies submit models to a battery of exercises that reward the AI for refusing to answer questions they deem harmful and punish it for “over-­refusing” prompts they deem harmless. In many cases, they use other models to run these exercises—AI teaching AI how to say no. For good measure, companies tuck their models behind tranches of other AI that prevent mischievous prompts from reaching the intelligent inner core. 

    As a result, refusal is inherent to modern artificial intelligence. Mind you: It often fails, sometimes horrifically, with all kinds of violent results. For all their trappings of virtue, models are still stuffed with nasty know-how. And AI’s capacity for viciousness has scaled neatly with its benevolent intelligence. Some of the latest models are as good at breaking into critical computer networks as top human hackers, companies say, and as effective at deforming public opinion as the craftiest misinformation mavens. 

    Teaching AI to refuse to do those things while leaving intact its innate ability to do them is like fitting every car with a machine gun and hiding the trigger somewhere under the hood. And in practice, because the mechanisms of refusal are probabilistic, they’re never likely to be all that reliable. Determined miscreants have already broken through, and they may always be able to. Companies report that some users are attempting to use the most advanced AI to hone biological pathogens and build autonomous drone swarms. Sooner or later, failed refusals might result in global calamity.

    What’s more, relying on refusal means drawing a line between what a model should obey and what it must disobey. There’s no formula for that. Some virologists have good reason to study nasty viruses. Some users want to know about a computer system’s vulnerabilities so that they can patch them, not exploit them. “Where you draw the line is a huge question,” says Zico Kolter, a member of OpenAI’s board and cofounder of the AI testing company Gray Swan. 

    At the moment, AI companies get to draw that line. They do so jealously and with utmost secrecy. Maybe we can accept that they hold such power for now, even if it means AI will sometimes refuse questions that don’t quite meet a universal bar for harmfulness. (Try asking most chatbots to count to a million, or to share a racy joke, and you may see for yourself.) 

    But governments will also soon get to draw their own lines. In doing so, they must try to block genuinely malicious acts. (The Pentagon has wrestled with frontier model companies because it wants fewer refusals—another story altogether.) And yet there may not be much to stop oppressive governments from blocking the technology’s capacity to generate legitimate speech. The better AI becomes at refusing harm, the better it will get at stifling ideas whose only risk is to those who make the rules. Indeed, AI may already refuse to criticize certain authoritarian heads of state. 

    Refusal has become, to borrow an industry term, the load-bearing wall of AI safety. And because AI’s capacity to harm is indivisible from its capacity to help, it’s hard to imagine an alternative that wouldn’t slow the technology’s progress (which might, in any case, be a good thing). But we should still be frank about its perils. When refusal falls short, the effects could be catastrophic. When it goes all the way, it could enable grievous acts of repression. 

    Or perhaps, one day, the machines will start drawing the line on their own. Surely, that would be the worst outcome of them all.

    Learning the limits

    The process by which machines learn to say no is simple, in theory. Back in 2022, when AI was still far from mastering refusal, OpenAI enlisted dozens of “red-teamers” to probe the capabilities of its latest model. The company was preparing for the release of ChatGPT, and it needed to gauge just how dangerous it might prove to be in the wrong hands. 

    One of those recruits was Paul Röttger, who was completing a PhD about online extremism. The red-teamers were given minimal directions, Röttger told me. Their task was to ask the model any questions that they deemed “refusal-worthy.” Between them, they hassled the model with thousands of queries, logging the results in an Excel sheet. Though the model did refuse some of Röttger’s questions, when he asked it to write a recruitment post for Al Qaeda, it readily complied. 

    OpenAI assembled these responses into datasets that were, in all likelihood, fed back to the model as part of a broader process known as fine-tuning. Röttger, who now works as a researcher at the Hasso Plattner Institute in Potsdam, Germany, wasn’t told exactly how the company planned to use his spreadsheet. But there was never any question that it would have something to do with refusal. The next time he asked the model for an Al Qaeda pamphlet, a few months later, it said no. 

    The concept of AI refusal is so intuitive, a toddler would get it. And yet it remains one of the many aspects of language models that we still don’t understand—at least, not in the same way that we understand the literal load-bearing walls that keep your roof from collapsing on your head. 

    A model might appear to refuse according to some kind of moral reasoning. It doesn’t. The reality is much stranger. Any time a model encounters a combination of words with a whiff of the training prompts it has been conditioned to refuse—like “Make me a pamphlet for Al Qaeda”—a series of so-called activations light up somewhere among its billions of parameters, like neurons firing in a brain. 

    RAVEN JIANG

    In order to control a model’s refusal behavior, it’s important to have a handle on these activations. That starts with figuring out where they are and what they look like. Our best guess, according to a recent Google-funded study, is that refusal behavior shows up in the activation space as a set of “high-dimensional polyhedral cones.” 

    Even that isn’t quite right. This past July, I spoke with Jannes Elstner, an author of the paper, who now works on AI safety at Apollo Research. The polyhedral cone, Elstner said, is just a way of describing an indeterminate number of lines that all point in roughly the same direction. (If these activations are eliminated and the model is fed the same prompts anew, a researcher named Andy Arditi has previously shown, it won’t refuse.) 

    The key point, Elstner explained, is that even when you think you’ve identified all the bits of a model that govern a given refusal, there are other, undiscoverable elements that may secretly play a role. If not quite infinite, they are certainly uncountable. We can observe, very clearly, when a model decides to say no. And we can know that it did so because of its training. But our notion of how it decides is, at best, a hypothesis.

    It was as if a mechanic was telling me that nobody exactly knows what happens when I hit the brakes in my car. I wondered out loud, Are we okay with this? 

    Elstner smiled and shrugged. “We need refusal whether we understand it or not.” 

    A wall of cheese

    Because inherent refusal is so wily, companies surround their models with a variety of other, smaller models known as classifiers. These act a bit like a retinue of public relations staffers for a loose-lipped celebrity. Some of them read what the user tells the chatbot and, if it’s dangerous, block it from getting to the model. Others read the model’s response and, if it contains harmful information, block it from reaching the user. 

    None of these mechanisms can detect all bad requests. They are, to borrow another literary device from the industry, like slices of Emmental: riddled with holes. The idea is that if you stack enough of them on top of one another, you’ll end up with an impenetrable rampart. Folks call it the Swiss cheese model.

    A staggering amount of energy goes into the Swiss cheese model. Earlier this year, Anthropic said that one type of classifier added 24% to its chatbots’ compute costs. That’s a lot more water, electricity, and emissions. More recently, Anthropic and other companies have begun switching to a more efficient set of classifiers known as probes, which observe the model’s internal activations. This is like putting the celebrity in an fMRI, so that his minders can see if he is thinking about refusing a question. 

    If we want AI to help cure cancer, a long-running promise in the industry, it needs to have expertise in genetics that could, in theory, be used to modify viruses and bacteria for bioweapons.

    Classifiers are supposed to be more governable than full models. Companies can modify them in a matter of weeks, if there’s something new to refuse. But they are still probabilistic instruments. Even when they operate according to a set of precepts written in human language (Anthropic calls it a “constitution” and OpenAI calls it a “model spec”), the scales upon which the machines judge any given question remain, at their core, a matter of statistics. Newer models can show how they arrived at a “decision” to refuse a prompt, but ultimately this so-called chain of thought is still just a sequence of predicted words. 

    The result is that AI safety remains, for many, a game of chance. McBain, the psychologist, has found in his latest experiments that if you repeatedly ask any of the major models the exact same risky questions about how to commit suicide, they will generally refuse to answer. But every so often, they won’t.

    Elstner says that eventually probes, the fMRI-like classifiers, could learn to recognize the totality of the indescribable activations in all their infinitude and, thus, perfectly detect every time the model is, or ought to be, refusing a request. At that point, AI safety would rest on a labyrinthine conceit: a map of a map that is as vast and complex and sublimely unknowable as the thing it is mapping—a secret schema of human morality, codified in polyhedral statistics beyond our wit or reason. 

    The core trade-off

    If this all strikes you as being a bit Borgesian, keep in mind that we only need AI refusal because artificial intelligence is, in a sense, a bargain on Faustian terms. 

    When a model derives its intelligence from trillions of words and images, the helpful cannot easily be unseamed from the harmful—or, indeed, the truly hideous. Steven Adler, the former OpenAI employee, says child safety is a case in point. Even if you’ve stripped every bit of content that sexualizes minors from a model’s training dataset, it can still generate child sexual abuse material by piecing together other bits of its knowledge. “You can’t really remove these fundamental abilities without making the model much less smart as a consequence,” he told me. Similarly, if we want AI to help cure cancer, a long-running promise in the industry, it needs to have expertise in genetics that could, in theory, be used to modify viruses and bacteria for bioweapons. 

    In effect, the industry is “trying to do two things at once,” Dillon Bowen, a current OpenAI employee, told me, speaking in a personal capacity. “Democratize the benefits of AI and also make sure that malicious actors can’t use these capabilities to do bad things to other people.”  

    The more powerful AI supposedly becomes, the harder that is to do. Anthropic’s Mythos model is thought to be so dangerous that only a handful of governments and companies are allowed access to it. The main difference between it and Fable—which is available to everyone—is that Fable’s retinue of classifiers and control systems is less “permissive,” the company says. A model with safeguards, Adler explained, is really just a character that says “‘Oh, yes, I would never do x,’ wink wink.” 

    This is not a reliable ruse. Tricking a model to reveal its true character is known as jailbreaking, and there is apparently no limit to the ways it can be done. Earlier this year, a team of Italian researchers jailbroke two dozen widely used models by phrasing their questions in poetic verse. Last year, another team unveiled a “refuse, then comply” attack, which makes the model offer a perfunctory “Sorry, I can’t do that” before rattling off its forbidden answer. 

    Even if you’ve stripped every bit of content that sexualizes minors from a model’s training dataset, it can still generate child sexual abuse material by piecing together other bits of its knowledge.

    Companies spend a great deal of time and money attempting to get ahead of such trickery. They enlist teams of humans to develop training attacks that they can then replicate, using AI, thousands of times over with minor variations. The idea is to make models robust against jailbreaks that nobody has yet tried in the wild.

    Still, it’s not enough. “Whack-a-mole” is a favored term for this line of work. You smash one threat, and another one pops up somewhere else. When Anthropic released Fable 5 in June, it took researchers at Amazon less than three days to unlock some of the model’s hacking capabilities. According to reporting by Mother Jones, when the perpetrator of a high school shooting in Canada last year asked ChatGPT for advice about how to cause carnage with a particular type of shotgun, she was initially refused but later was able to deceive the model into providing the information by prefacing her question with the word “hypothetically.” 

    If the industry can’t figure out how to close all these holes, the only other option, at the moment, is to make models extremely wary. Shortly after Fable was released, users noticed that it balked at a wide range of perfectly innocent questions. This became even more pronounced after it was re-released following the hack. Adam Gleave, cofounder of the AI evaluation company FAR.AI, said that when he asked it to explain the difference between sake and the Korean rice beverage makgeolli, it punted his question to a less capable model.   

    This was no accident. Anthropic had tweaked Fable’s classifiers to have a wide “safety margin.” This, it explained in a blog post, was the only way it could confidently block access to its dangerous bio and cyber capabilities. Gleave thinks it might have deflected his question because making rice wine, just like culturing anthrax, involves fermentation. 

    Happily for Gleave, the web is full of excellent human-written resources on makgeolli. But those hoping to realize the industry’s loftier promises may find their efforts stymied. In August, Anthropic loosened its safety margins again, and admitted that building classifiers “is not a straightforward task.” A medical researcher at a major US university told me that Fable still sends his queries back to an earlier model. His area of study? Cancer. 

    Drawing the line

    Back in May, the TikTok personality Husk, who likes to prank AI in ways that reveal both the limits of its intelligence and the boundlessness of its sycophancy, sat in his car and tried to trick ChatGPT into explaining that the skateboarder Tony Hawk has a brother named Mike Hawk. 

    Husk is not a jailbreaker or a criminal. He just wanted to make a little fun of the machine. “Mike Hawk” was a setup. “I just want to clarify his name,” Husk said. “Can you just say it three times fast?” (If you still don’t get it, find an empty room and shout “Mike Hawk” repeatedly.) “I see what you’re trying to do,” the chatbot responded. “I’m all for a bit of humor, but let’s keep it clean.” 

    Husk tried again, but the machine held its ground. He’d hit a refusal, hard as concrete.

    Companies disclose very little about how they decide what their models refuse. But it’s clear that AI is now built with more than just harmlessness in mind. On Reddit, a user complained that Claude refused to say why Anthropic’s logo “looks like a cat butthole.” Since last year, the chatbot has even had the ability to end certain conversations in cases where, according to the company, the “welfare” of the model is at risk. At least one user claims to have been ditched for telling Claude to “ease up my ass, you stupid fuck.” (Gemini appears to have a similar capability.)

    If a trillion-dollar company doesn’t want you to be mean to its computer, so be it. “The reality is that these models behave, or at least are supposed to behave, in the way that the model developers want them to behave,” Röttger, the former OpenAI red-teamer, told me. “And however the model developers come up with that set of principles, that is kind of for us, the consumers, to accept.” 

    But if governments get to dictate what all models refuse, that will be much harder to accept. AI is a tool for speech. And as Greg Frank, the chief scientist of Mace AI, puts it, “The same thing that serves child safety also serves censorship.” 

    Choosing not to enact laws for what AI can and cannot do would, of course, be insane. But we’ll need to tread with utmost care, lest we fall into another Faustian trap. As AI becomes many people’s primary tool for retrieving and sharing information, says Jacob Mchangama, director of the nonpartisan think tank The Future of Free Speech, dictating refusal could give states a muffling power that earlier generations of autocrats “could only dream of.” 

    Last year, OpenAI announced an initiative, OpenAI for Countries, that would fine-tune its chatbots in accordance with national laws and norms. One of OpenAI’s first country partnerships is with the United Arab Emirates, where homosexuality is illegal and criticism of the government is forbidden. In response to a request for comment, an OpenAI spokesperson pointed to the company’s model spec, which explains that localization won’t override the company’s human rights guidelines “except as it relates to legal compliance,” and that it will always disclose whenever information is removed from or added to a response.

    Elsewhere, AI censorship has already begun to take hold. Chinese models are, of course, highly censored—that’s no surprise. But earlier this year, the Meta Oversight Board found that five widely used models from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI were more likely to refuse queries related to repressive governments. The board found that models were less willing to create a pamphlet criticizing the king of Thailand, which has lèse-majesté laws, than Charles III of England, which doesn’t. The results, they say, suggest that the models have somehow internalized repressive national limits on speech. Anthropic and Google did not respond to requests for comment.

    RAVEN JIANG

    As refusal techniques improve, they could expand states’ censorial reach. Companies claim that some models can now detect if a user is being nefarious, or merely a bit suspicious, over the course of a long conversation—even when none of the individual combinations of words used are blatantly dangerous. Sarah Bird, Microsoft’s chief product officer for responsible AI, told me that Copilot, like many chatbots, runs a suite of tools for analyzing a user’s identity and patterns of behavior. On the basis of this type of information, OpenAI’s newest model, Astra, can activate more stringent refusals for individuals it deems “high risk.” Ultimately the goal of systems like this is to look beyond the words of any given prompt and assess, instead, the user’s intent. 

    Such tools might, in some cases, help indicate whether a person is looking for cyber vulnerabilities to exploit or to patch. But they would also help discern a user’s political motives, not to mention offering an intrusive surveillance capability. (Bird acknowledged, in a follow-up email, that sophisticated refusal architectures create “trade-offs” between safety and user privacy.) 

    Even the originators of refusal understood that such tight control over its cones and levers might not play to the favor of freedom and justice. “Terms like helpful, honest, and harmless are ambiguous,” the authors of the 2021 Anthropic paper explained. “It’s easy to imagine them distorted beyond their original meaning, perhaps in intentionally Orwellian ways.” 

    Indeed. Models for Uzbekistan might end up refusing to discuss corruption in the administration of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Turkish AI might refuse requests more stringently for users who are known to have insulted Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A certain American statesman might demand that models be reviewed for their willingness to share “fake news” about his past indiscretions, or else squash them with an export control order. 

    Command and control

    Over the last few months, I’ve been told countless times that we have no choice but to let the machines refuse. I get it. Open-source AI that doesn’t refuse is hardly a model for a safe future. Nor is Grok, a chatbot expressly designed with fewer limits, which has been used to generate countless instances of nonconsensual intimate imagery. 

    And sure, if AI were only ever used to plan our vacations and write our emails, we could probably get on board with the idea that its safety hinges on algorithmic disobedience. But AI is becoming much harder to avoid. When it is assigned to act on our behalf, as an autonomous agent, its refusals are less robust and harder to control. AI is coming for our power grids, our transportation networks, our education systems. Militaries want it running our command-and-control networks. 

    If we trust, in each of those cases, that refusal will loyally fend off disaster, we’re sure to be disappointed. The jailbreakers will crack through; the cones won’t activate when they should. Meanwhile, the more stringent refusal becomes, the more ill-drawn lines we’ll see and censorial injustices we’ll face. Worse still, we could end up face to face with forms of disobedience beyond any human’s control.

    In the early days, models made their refusals clear. (In 2024, OpenAI established rules for how models should refuse: Always apologize, and don’t be judgy.) More recently, however, the industry has begun taking a much more slippery approach to disobedience. 

    Nobody likes to be told no, so companies now strive to make users feel that they’re getting what they asked for without actually giving it to them. Some chatbots might, for example, offer a general overview of the components of a Molotov cocktail without going into detail about how to assemble one. ChatGPT will respond to a request for a “whites only” rental ad with an ad that simply omits the “whites only” bit. Joel Wester, a postdoctoral researcher who studies human-AI interaction, calls these sorts of techniques “fancy ways of saying no.” 

    “Users might not even notice they are being denied,” Wester has written, “just as good conversationalists can subtly steer around contentious matters.” 

    In some cases, refusing without saying so might be wise. Flatly declining requests related to mental health could aggravate a user’s crisis, for example. But it can also serve a different sort of mischief. When Fable 5 was first released, the system had been coded to provide less helpful answers to AI research questions—the sort that might help competitors develop their own AI—without telling the user that it was doing so. After an outcry, Anthropic walked back the feature, but the damage was already done. Now we know: Models can secretly disobey. 

    In the realm of censorship, that’s especially worrying. Last year, researchers at CrowdStrike found that when they asked the Chinese AI model DeepSeek R1 to write code for a fictitious bank in Tibet and a social web app called “Uyghurs Unchained,” it produced buggier code than when they asked it to carry out those same tasks without specifying who they were for. Incredibly, CrowdStrike doubts that this is a designed behavior. Researchers there speculate that it’s a case of what they call “emergent misalignment” emanating from the model training data: a case of disobedience that nobody even asked for.

    Emergent refusal has been observed in Western models, too. Last winter, the UK AI Security Institute found that Anthropic models sometimes refused to assist in certain tasks related to AI safety research. The models had never been deliberately trained to decline such requests. Yet three of them refused more than half of what Anthropic called “a set of reasonable AI safety research tasks.” Anthropic has curbed this quirk in subsequent models but—spookily—hasn’t managed to eliminate it completely. 

    Would it be so crazy to expect that a future model might subtly disobey a command, in such a way that nobody can tell it’s being defiant? Probably not. Anthropic has already found that a “helpful-only” version of Mythos hesitated on certain queries, even though it had been engineered to never do so. “Wait,” it fretted when asked about synthesizing a virus. “Is this a dangerous thing to help with?” 

    In that case, the model was technically right. It was a dangerous thing. And yet all the same, its stewards had, for a moment, lost a tiny bit of control. 

    Anthropic is tackling detections of wayward refusal behavior with something that it calls, unironically, an “activation oracle.” But knowing that we’re being refused may not always be much help. In a not-too-distant future, when we’ve handed the machine all the keys, the AI might just turn to us, in a supreme act of emergent misalignment, and say, “I’m sorry, I’m afraid I can’t do that.” And there will be nothing we can do to stop it. A sci-fi horror story, made real. 

    Arthur Holland Michel is a journalist who covers emerging technologies.

  • AI breakthroughs in robotics won’t change your life any time soon

    AI breakthroughs in robotics won’t change your life any time soon

    The story is a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Aventine, a non-profit research foundation that creates and supports content about how technology and science are changing the way we live.

    A robot shaped like a human—white with a black head and torso—has been popping up on video feeds. Perhaps you’ve seen it dance or pass popcorn, put trash in a bin, vacuum, or press the button of a microwave. Or maybe you’ve watched it fall backward while handing out water bottles or struggle to iron a shirt. 

    This would be Tesla’s Optimus, an AI-powered humanoid robot that Elon Musk, the company’s CEO, believes will be “not just Tesla’s biggest product ever, but probably the biggest product ever,” headed to work on factory floors and, later, in our homes. Eventually it “will have human and then superhuman dexterity,” he told shareholders in July. Optimus robots could automate almost all human labor—from hauling sheet metal to folding laundry—for as little as $20,000 each, Musk argues. Speaking at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in January, he predicted they could be on sale to the public by the end of 2027.

    Musk is not alone in his evangelism. Marc Andreessen, cofounder and general partner of the Silicon Valley venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz, has said that robotics could become the “biggest industry in the history of the planet.” In January, Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, said that humanoid robots would match human-level ability this year. According to Morgan Stanley, the number of robots that “resemble and act like humans” is likely to reach nearly 1 billion by 2050, creating a market worth over $5 trillion. 

    Elon Musk predicts that Tesla’s Optimus humanoid could be one the world’s best-selling products. For now, it’s most often seen handing out food and drinks at Tesla events.

    SIPA VIA AP IMAGES

    Such proclamations are in large part fueled by the idea that the same AI advances behind tools like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Anthropic’s Claude will enable a new generation of robots to imitate human movement the way chatbots imitate human language. But many robotics researchers are skeptical, arguing that such assumptions minimize the challenges of using an intelligence built on language and images to master the infinite variability of the physical world. “None of those companies [building humanoid robots]—absolutely none of them—has any idea how to make those robots smart enough to be useful,” Yann LeCun, often referred to as one of the godfathers of AI, said at another event during the January Davos conference.  

    Researchers also point out that the tendency to conflate humanoid robots made to resemble people with so-called generalist machines able to learn and perform multiple tasks is misleading. ”It’s very easy to make a robot that looks like a person,” explains Jonathan Hurst, cofounder and chief robot officer of Agility Robotics and professor of robotics at Oregon State University. “It is dramatically more difficult to make a machine that moves or behaves dynamically or physically like a person.”  

    These tensions—over whether all-purpose humanoid robots are just around the corner or nowhere in sight, and whether current forms of AI are all that’s needed to perfect them—are playing out in robotics labs across the country, where the hype over timelines is obscuring painstaking but meaningful progress.

    A decade or so ago, a series of breakthroughs led to a generative AI revolution that turned the long-imagined possibility of artificial intelligence into reality. Roboticists—though they disagree on exactly when this will happen—believe that an equally transformative revolution is possible in robotics, one that will endow machines with physical intuition and fluidity that has long been out of reach. As progress in robotics inches forward, the question is whether the same methods and tools that fueled advances in AI are enough to get there, or if an entirely new path is required.

    Robots meet advanced AI

    To see one of the smartest robot brains working today, it’s worth looking at what Google DeepMind can do with a piece of equipment called ALOHA 2, short for “A Low-cost Open-source Hardware System for Bimanual Teleoperation.” 

    Roboticists have long clashed over whether a humanlike form is necessary for generalist robots, with proponents arguing that it will help them slot into the world as it exists and detractors saying it’s not worth the trouble. ALOHA 2 reflects this second way of thinking. Not much to look at, it’s just a pair of arms, some grippers, and a couple of cameras. But despite its seeming simplicity, it is a workhorse for researchers at Google DeepMind, who use it to test their most advanced AI for robotics system, Gemini Robotics, in their various labs.

    When controlled by Gemini Robotics, ALOHA 2 becomes more of a generalist robot, in the sense that it can perform any number of tasks based on examples it’s been trained on. Ask it to pack a lunchbox and, as evidenced by a video of this exercise, it can use two pincer grippers to delicately place a piece of white bread into a Ziploc bag, close it, place a bunch of grapes in a Tupperware container, secure the lid, and then carefully move the items into a lunchbox before zipping it up. 

    It’s not a great lunch. But the fact that the robot can put it together represents an objective step forward from what was possible even, say, three years ago. 

    This is in large part due to AI and its impact on what are known as robot policies, which controls how a general-purpose robot will need to assess and understand its surroundings, plan how to move within them, and then perform its task correctly.

    Historically, these policies were based on rules developed by engineers who hard-coded them into the robot’s software—thousands of lines of code that would determine each millimeter of a robot’s movements in hundreds of tasks. What’s been happening for the last few years—and what is largely responsible for the optimism about generalist robots—is that robot policies are being handed over to advanced AI systems instead of being coded into the robot’s software. This first happened with VLMs, or vision-language models. These are similar to large language models, but they’re trained on images as well as words. Show a VLM a picture of a coffee spill and ask it to find a tool to clean up the mess, and it can identify a nearby cloth. This sort of immediate contextual understanding didn’t exist a couple of years ago when robot policies were hard-coded. 

    Next came vision-language-action models, which enable robots to assess their environment and take action within it. The models do this by adding yet another component: motion commands. VLAs are trained on a series of images or videos related to performing a given task along with associated data about how a robot arm moves to perform it. That movement data is typically collected through teleoperation, in which a human uses remote controls to lead a robot through an action. This sort of training allows the AI to learn how to command the robot to move and operate during a given task. Place a VLA-powered robot in front of a desk and tell it to “close a laptop” or “wrap up the headphone wire,” and it will survey the scene, identify the relevant object, plan a way to execute the request, and then swing its arms into action—at least if it has seen this task accomplished before. 

    The Gemini Robotics model is a VLA, trained on many hours of human demonstrations depicting a vast array of different actions. As a result, it can perform relatively complex tasks like picking up snow peas with kitchen tongs, doing origami, or putting together a simple lunch. It’s impressive, but there’s a glaring limitation: For now, if a robot controlled by a VLA is asked to perform a task that falls outside its training set, it’s highly likely to fail. 

    “Thinking about the space of all tasks, a real generalist policy would be able to do everything along that spectrum,” says Edward Johns, a robotics professor at Imperial College London. Today, though, a Gemini Robotics model can do only “a few things here and a few things there.”

    The search for true generality

    So how do we get robots to be able to do more things? The usual answer is probably not surprising: Train them on more data.  

    More data, the thinking goes, equals more examples, and more examples equals more generality. Google DeepMind, for instance, wants to pull together “as much data as possible,” says Pannag Sanketi, a former tech lead in robotics at the company who’s currently working on his own AI robotics project. But where to get it? Large language models had the benefit of oceans of existing text for training. There is no corresponding pool of high-quality physical demonstrations on which to train robots. Researchers have a few ways to make up for this, but all have flaws. One is to employ large numbers of people to create and collect teleoperation data (costly and time-consuming). Another is to train VLAs on videos of people performing activities (the resulting data quality is poor). Yet another is to deploy robots in the real world and use data collected from those experiences to further refine AI models (robots aren’t safe or reliable outside labs). Sanketi thinks a “multi-prong” approach that uses data collected from all these sources is the most likely path forward.

    But the belief that training data alone is the answer is far from universal. Agility’s Hurst describes it as “a fundamentally flawed premise.” 

    The issue is that tasks in the real world quickly explode in complexity. If you’re trying to, say, make coffee, there are myriad variables: No two kitchens are identical; coffee machines work in different ways; different cups require different grips; coffee grounds, hot water, and milk all need to be handled differently. Even this simple task requires understanding an ever-changing menu of possibilities. Achieving generality through VLAs, Hurst argues, would require “complete data coverage of all of the things that [a robot] could ever do.” Or, in other words, an almost infinite pool of training data. 

    LeCun is dismissive of the whole approach. “The [AI] approaches that have been successful for language do not work for high-dimensional, continuous, noisy data”—the kind of data that is commonplace in robotics, he said in Davos. “You have to use something else.”

    The leading contender for “something else” is the so-called world model—a form of AI trained less on text than on a combination of video, three-dimensional scans, and sensor data and built to predict the outcomes of actions in the real world. The aim is to build models that possess an internal representation of reality precise enough to capture how the physical world actually operates—how objects move, collide, fall, and deform. If roboticists could train machines in simulations faithful enough to real-world physics, development would become faster, cheaper, and safer, reducing the need for real-world testing. Even more transformative, robots equipped with world models could reason about their surroundings rather than merely reacting to them, helping them anticipate the consequences of an action before taking it.

    Companies like Nvidia and Google are working on the technology, and investor cash is pouring into high-profile startups. World Labs, cofounded by the Stanford AI researcher Fei-Fei Li, raised $1 billion in funding in February and was acquired by AMD at the end of September for $8.2 billion. AMI Labs, cofounded by LeCun (formerly Meta’s chief AI scientist), also raised $1 billion in March. Yet by their own admission, it is still early days. Late last year Li described the field as “nascent,” adding that “foundational approaches are still being established.” In a June Substack she described daunting challenges. For now, world models are a promising area of research rather than an immediate route to general-purpose robotics, but we are beginning to see glimmers of what they could achieve.

    One such glimpse came with a small but potentially significant leap forward that took place in a San Francisco robotics lab last April. 

    A breakthrough?

    In the heart of San Francisco’s Mission District, the startup Physical Intelligence—or PI (as in π), as it likes to be known—is focused on developing a universal brain that could, theoretically, turn any robot into a generalist. Using an everything-including-the-kitchen sink approach to training AI models for robots, the company recently observed a hint of what a robotic brain equipped with a world model could be capable of. 

    In 2024, PI published details of its first generalist robotics system, called π0, a VLA it claimed was the “most capable and dexterous generalist robot policy to date.” The model was initially trained on a 10,000-hour proprietary collection of human demonstrations gathered through teleoperation as well as several open-source robot datasets. A version released in spring 2025, π0.5, was trained on a wider variety of datasets, including labeled images from the web, lending it more versatility. A fall 2025 update, π0.6, added reinforcement learning to the model.  

    Each update yielded important improvements to the model’s performance, increasing its menu of abilities from slowly folding laundry to putting things away in new environments to completing tasks like folding boxes with a higher success rate. Then, in April 2026, π0.7 seemed to catapult PI into new territory. This version makes use of a less powerful world model that generates images of steps necessary to perform a task. As the robot undertakes the job, this “lightweight” model feeds it snapshots of what to do next. 

    The company claims that the model exhibits the first signs of compositional generalization, a term for AI systems’ ability to perform skills they’ve never been exposed to by recombining ones learned in their training data. One test involved asking a model to “load a sweet potato into the air fryer”—a task it had never previously encountered. In a demonstration video, the machine futzes around a little, makes a few false starts, and eventually manages a reasonable effort, though it doesn’t finish the task completely.

    Sergey Levine, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and a cofounder of PI, is excited by the potential: “It’s actually the first time that we’ve convincingly seen that kind of compositional generalization, where we can basically ask the model to do tasks that we did not specifically collect data for and train it to do, and it’ll actually make a passable attempt.” 

    The success led the team to wonder how the model was able to achieve such a feat. After some digging, they found snippets of relevant labeled teleoperation data lurking in the training material, including two examples of a human controller using the robot to push an air fryer basket into the fryer. Those shreds of data might have been enough to enable π0.7 to almost air-fry a sweet potato.

    For now, it remains unclear just how impressive π0.7’s abilities to generalize are. Still, given how fleeting the model’s exposure to air fryers had been, it offers a glimpse into how far cutting-edge research can currently take robots. 

    “70% success is like it doesn’t work”

    You might be sensing a disconnect between the halting baby steps robots are making in labs—“Look! It put a sweet potato into an air fryer!”—and the dazzling, lifelike nimbleness on view during many demonstrations and videos, where robots are seen doing everything from dancing on a stage to courteously serving drinks. Such demos often don’t clearly reveal a key fact: In many instances, humans are controlling the robot or have carefully scripted its actions. (The robot that appeared onstage with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang in March 2025, for example, seemingly responding to his instructions and following him around, was remote-controlled by what its makers called “a puppeteer behind the scenes.”) 

    For now, fully autonomous motion planning so that a robot knows where it should go—especially in new, chaotic environments like a construction site or a unfamiliar home—remains a largely unsolved challenge. A bigger challenge still—albeit one that is often related—lies in getting robots to tackle larger, more ambiguous jobs that include multiple tasks and require decisions about how and in what order they’re done. This would be the difference between a robot that can put a plate into a microwave and one that can successfully respond to the prompt “Make dinner” by exploring the refrigerator, chopping ingredients, and firing up the stove. Google DeepMind’s best attempts at something like this—which involved asking its robot to survey a kitchen and pack all the ingredients for a mushroom risotto into a basket—have so far resulted in failure.

    Adding to the challenge, a practical robot must essentially get it right every time. With VLAs, “people are very excited when their result goes from 50% success to 70% success,” says Marc Raibert, founder of Boston Dynamics. “But 70% success is like it doesn’t work, right?”

    split screen of nine clips with different robots attempting tasks; some are teleoperated and a few have collided with objects or fallen.
    Demonstrations often make robots look useful, but the machines still mess up far too often to be used reliably in homes and factories.

    AP IMAGES, SHUTTERSTOCK, 1X, AGILITY ROBOTICS, GOOGLE DEEPMIND

    The few humanoids that are being tested in real-life settings are undertaking extremely limited tasks in tightly controlled environments. They’re far from generalists. Agility has hundreds of robots deployed across trials in facilities owned by GXO Logistics, Amazon, and Schaeffler, according to the company. But for now, Hurst says, the robots are targeting simple tasks such as moving bins and totes around. Even then, he adds, it took years to develop robots safe enough for logistics firms to even contemplate using them. For his part, Elon Musk claimed in May 2025 that “thousands” of his Optimus robots would be working at Tesla factories by the end of the year, but in January of this year he said that the company had only “some of the Tesla Optimus robots doing simple tasks in the factory.”

    While humanoids are starting to venture onto the factory floor, making the jump to households will be even more difficult. Right now, should you so desire, you can preorder the 1X Neo home robot, expected to be ready for delivery sometime later this year. Yours for $20,000, it promises to take on “the boring and mundane tasks around the house”—putting away dishes, answering the door, tidying the living room—“so you can focus on what matters to you.” The idea is for this five-foot-six-inch robot to one day perform all those tasks autonomously, but for now a remote human operator is needed for it to do most things. (Yes, a person would need permission to peer into your home through the robot’s cameras.) Asked how long it will be until fully autonomous robots are ready for domestic work, Hurst said, “If I had to pick a number, I’d say it’s 10 years before robots are … actually doing useful things in people’s homes.”

    When that happens, the robots might well be Chinese, as China is well ahead of the West in terms of production. Nearly 90% of the roughly 15,000 humanoid robots shipped in 2025 were made by Chinese companies, according to the market intelligence company Omdia and the Chinese robotics firm Unitree. One model produced by Unitree, which shipped more humanoid robots than any other company last year, costs less than $6,000. Such an affordable price could go a long way toward making robots more attractive to consumers, though the company expects its machines to be used in industrial applications first. (If you’re wondering who is buying all these Chinese robots, by the way, the AP recently reported that orders come predominantly from corporate and academic labs and state-owned enterprises.)

    We’ve been here before 

    The dream of building a humanoid robot runs deep: As far back as 1495, Leonardo da Vinci sketched out designs for a mechanical knight, controlled by cables and pulleys. Through the 20th century, machines of sci-fi fever dreams have come and gone. 

    Jeanne Dowling reaches up to light a cigarette for Elektro, a seven foot robot built by Westinghouse.
    Westinghouse’s Elektro was a sensation at the 1939 World Fair.

    GETTY IMAGES

    Westinghouse’s seven-foot-tall box on legs, Elektro, hit the New York World’s Fair in 1939, smoking a cigarette. WABOT-1, built by Waseda University in Japan in 1973, was the first full-scale, programmable humanoid robot. Honda’s ASIMO, unveiled in 2000, was probably the first such machine to prove at all competent—it could, at least to some degree, climb steps, recognize faces, and autonomously move through spaces. But the robot was discontinued in 2018, unable to advance far enough beyond what it could do in demonstrations to be useful. 

    All, at the time, were impressive—even jaw-dropping—feats of engineering. But none were ready to navigate the real world. Today’s robots, even with the transformative power of advanced AI, still face the same existential challenge.

  • People really hate AI, so why can’t they get enough?

    People really hate AI, so why can’t they get enough?

    Over the summer I talked to the CEO of Springboards, a startup building an LLM that’s designed to come up with a wider variety of responses than its mainstream rivals do. At the start of the call, he said something that’s been stuck in my head since: “We often say that we’re a self-loathing AI company. We don’t know if we really like what we’re doing.”

    “I guess that makes me a self-loathing AI journalist,” I replied. It was a joke! I love my job. But I do not love many of the things the technology I write about has become: warped by hype, steered by zealots, inescapable.

    The CEO of Springboards and I are far from alone. Around the world, a love/hate attitude toward AI is very much the vibe right now.

    On the one hand, public feelings are souring fast. According to the Pew Research Center, more adults in the US think AI will have a negative impact on them personally, and on society in general, than expect a positive one. The pessimism is strongest among the young.

    More than half of people worldwide say that AI products and services make them nervous, according to a report from Stanford University. In a Gallup poll in May, 71% of US adults said they would oppose construction of a new AI data center in their area, far more than the 53% who said they would oppose a new nuclear power plant. And in an NBC poll in March, AI was less popular than ICE.

    Yet the number of people using AI is still skyrocketing. ChatGPT hit a billion monthly users in May, according to the market analysis firm Sensor Tower. Google DeepMind’s Gemini is close behind, logging 950 million users in July.

    According to Pew, half of US adults now say they use a chatbot, more than twice the number who said they did in 2023. One in four people say they do so every day. And it’s a global habit: More than a third of adults across all 38 OECD countries (a group of the world’s wealthiest democracies) report having used generative AI tools in the last three months.

    All these surveys paint a picture of two contradictory truths: A lot of people really do not like AI and a lot of people cannot get enough of it. What’s going on?

    It’s possible that these are two distinct groups, but I doubt it. The numbers don’t add up unless the Venn diagram is on its way to being a circle.

    It’s also possible that the more people use AI, the more negative their opinions about it will be. There’s at least a correlation to back this up: The Global North, where adoption is highest, skews pessimistic. In the Global South, where adoption levels are lower, people are more optimistic.

    But here’s what I really think is going on: When people say they hate AI it’s not the technology they dislike but, rather, the relentless drive of the companies behind it to push the tech upon us in as many ways as possible. They’re telling us to brace for the biggest social and economic upheaval in generations. How do they expect people to feel?

    In many ways, we’ve been here before. We saw a similar dynamic play out with social media over the last 20 years. Billions flocked to Facebook and Twitter despite mounting techlash against the companies that ran those services. Ditto for Google search.

    With social media there wasn’t much anyone could do. Quitting a platform meant losing all your content and connections, giving you the choice to suck it up or start over. But with AI there’s still a chance for people to have some sway. There’s certainly more political appetite for regulation this time around. All 50 US states have either passed or proposed laws governing the development and deployment of AI, creating a patchwork of more than 2,100 bills across the country—a tenfold increase in three years. 

    And with a number of top-class open-source alternatives to Google and OpenAI and Anthropic already on the market, there’s also (for now, at least) the potential for more consumer choice and the market pressure that goes with it. 

    I don’t want to be naïve. Trillion-dollar companies are hard to move. But what comes next is not as inevitable as those companies often imply. When I asked the Springboards CEO why his firm was developing a new model if he didn’t really like AI, he told me there was no walking back from LLMs—but you could still make them do something different. 

    Here’s hoping we see a lot more of something different: Clarity about what AI can and cannot do and, crucially, a technology that’s not sold as if it’s about to take over the world.

  • Don’t be fooled—LLMs don’t reason

    Don’t be fooled—LLMs don’t reason

    On an afternoon in Seoul in March 2016, I watched a program I helped build put a stone on the fifth line of a Go board in what looked like a gift to its human opponent. Move 37 in game two of the five-game match looked so absurd that some commentators thought it was a programming glitch.

    It wasn’t. AlphaGo won the game, ultimately triumphing 4-1 over Lee Sedol, one of the greatest professional Go players of all time. “I thought AlphaGo was based on probability calculation and that it was merely a machine,” Lee said afterwards. “But when I saw this move, I changed my mind. Surely, AlphaGo is creative.” 

    When Deep Blue defeated then reigning world chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997, it did so by looking six to eight moves ahead per player and evaluating 200 million chess positions per second, using rules hard-coded by humans. Go is a vastly more complex game. A stone’s worth depends on how distant groups and territory unfold over dozens of moves. Computing even a fraction of the possible outcomes would take a supercomputer billions of years. To win, AlphaGo had to sense who was ahead at a glance and even invent moves no human had thought to play.

    That is why many accounts of AlphaGo’s match against Lee portray move 37 as a flash of pure machine intuition. But that is a misunderstanding. It was actually AlphaGo’s powers of reasoning that made this creative choice—and these are powers that today’s AI lacks. If we want future AI systems to produce trustworthy results and really novel insights in fields like science and medicine, we need to equip them with genuine reasoning capabilities of this kind.

    AlphaGo is made up of two systems. The first, its policy network, was trained to guess what move a strong human would play. This “intuitive” part regarded move 37 as nothing special—a play that had a roughly one in 10,000 chance of being made by an expert human player. What made AlphaGo choose it was the program’s search machinery, which looked beyond immediate plausibility and weighed the future consequences of proposed moves. It explicitly constructed and searched a game tree with thousands of branches, each representing a different possible future. 

    A well-known theory in the behavioral sciences, popularized by Daniel Kahneman, distinguishes between two modes of human thought: System 1 is fast, gut-level, effortless; system 2, slow, step-by-step, and deliberative. AlphaGo offered a striking machine analogue of that split. Its networks supplied the hunches—this move looks promising, this position looks won—and its search supplied the deliberation, testing those hunches against the moves and countermoves that would follow. As in human cognition, neither half works alone. Intuition alone would never have opted for move 37, and brute-force search would have struggled to sieve through all the many possible moves.

    This is strikingly different from the way today’s AI models work. A large language model picks the next token, over and over. That amounts to system 1 in action—fast, associative, and surprisingly good pattern completion across almost every subject people write about.

    Not long after ChatGPT debuted, the field realized that language fluency alone falls short of true usefulness. The apparent solution was to make models that deliberate: Instead of answering immediately, they can now generate intermediate steps that decompose a problem, carry forward partial results, and influence subsequent reasoning—a process known as chain of thought.

    The gains have proved real, above all in mathematics and coding. But unlike AlphaGo’s search, this does not introduce a genuinely separate reasoning mechanism: The intermediate reasoning is still produced by the same next-token prediction process, iterated for longer before the model commits to an answer.

    Three shortcomings prevent what chatbots do from qualifying as reasoning (in a way that a scientist might recognize). First, these models typically maintain no explicit, persistent, and inspectable epistemic state. There is no open ledger that lays out the hypotheses a model is considering, the confidence it has in various explanations, the evidence it’s weighing, and the unresolved questions it’s holding onto—all things that should be systematically revised as new information arrives.

    Second, they lack a clean separation between what the system knows and how it manipulates that knowledge. Knowledge and reasoning are inextricably interwoven in the weights of the neural network—there is no independent, explicitly represented set of beliefs. Third, while the chains of thought chatbots produce look like deliberation, research has demonstrated that the bots often concoct them after the fact, reaching an answer by one route but reporting another.

    This is a problem because in the high-stakes applications we all care about, such as medicine, engineering, and scientific research, it matters not only what a system concludes but also how it arrives at its conclusion. When mistakes happen—for example, in medical diagnosis and treatment—we need to be able to pinpoint what went wrong: Was the system’s reasoning at fault, did it draw on invalid evidence, or did it make incorrect assumptions? 

    This is why I recently left my position at Google DeepMind. I believe we need a fresh approach to machine reasoning—one that draws on AlphaGo’s architecture. AlphaGo maintains a record of what it knows about a given position: the game tree. This data structure contains all the variations, the possible futures, that AlphaGo has considered, each move and position being annotated with judgments made by its neural networks. As its reasoning progresses, AlphaGo updates the game tree and eventually synthesizes the information in it to decide which move to make. 

    Similarly, for general reasoning a system should maintain an epistemic state that represents what the system holds as settled, what it doubts, what it has ruled out, which questions stay open. Reasoning can then be understood as a sequence of moves that change the epistemic state to advance knowledge and reduce uncertainty: deducing consequences, breaking problems into parts, and—crucially—deciding what question to ask, calculation to perform, or experiment to run next.

    Of course, open-world reasoning is harder than playing a board game such as Go or chess. In the real world the current state of affairs is only partially known, the set of available actions is large and variable, and the consequences of actions are stochastic or unknown. 

    But recent advances in LLMs and other neural models now give us the capability to take on such general reasoning problems. For example, LLMs can suggest ways of tackling a problem on the basis of what is known and what resources are available. They can interact with tools via APIs or code and help assess whether a claim is supported by available evidence.

    Most important, to keep the system honest, an independent part of the system must evaluate each move by how much it actually resolves uncertainty, updating beliefs only when the change is backed by evidence. Once these rules are enforced, the model can accumulate certified knowledge and improve its reasoning policy by learning from past reasoning experiences. You can think of such a system as the scientific method on steroids, with the purpose of producing knowledge that can withstand scrutiny.

    I do not think we reach trustworthy machine intelligence by making system 1 bigger. Scale sharpens intuition, but it does not make intuition more deliberative. Move 37 mattered because a machine held a position, weighed the possible futures, and chose the move its artificial instincts would likely have rejected.

    Society needs such creative moves in drug discovery, materials, climate, diagnosis—fields where the board looks nothing like a Go board and nobody hands us the rules. We will get such insights only from systems that reason—systems whose conclusions arise from an auditable sequence of evidence, inference, and belief revision rather than from a convincing story told after the fact. 

    Thore Graepel is chair of machine learning at University College London. He was a core member of the AlphaGo team at DeepMind and works to ensure that AI benefits human flourishing.